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David Miranda, the partner of the Guardian journalist Glenn Greenwald, was
detained at London Heathrow airport on 18 August 2013 under Schedule 7 of the
Terrorism Act 2000.  He was in transit between Berlin and Rio de Janeiro, carrying
what appears to have been leaked classified material used for journalistic purposes.
  He was questioned without a lawyer, searched in person and his possessions
(computer, phone, video games, other items), and his possessions were retained for
a period that may not exceed seven days.
His detention raises an important point for the public about what rights a citizen or
foreign national would have in such a situation, and whether and how such rights
might be enforced in the courts.   To answer that general, to some extent abstract
question, I have made some factual assumptions that would cast the government’s
actions in Miranda’s case in a dark light. The relevant question for many is about the
legality and constitutionality of taking predatory action against someone assisting a
journalist to publish leaked information about surveillance that is highly embarrassing
for the government. The following discussion provides a set of answers to basic
questions the concerned citizen might ask, and while it can at times get technical
and lengthy, it is meant especially for the lay reader or junior lawyer who wants more
nuance than what is available in the mainstream press.
1.     Can the Government really do that?
If by ‘that’ we mean just crack down on a reporter or his partner/assistant, using
powers that seem manifestly conferred for other uses, the answer is ‘no, it can’t.’
Miranda’s rights were interfered with under a number of provisions of Schedule 7,
but the main power of detention, questioning, searching, and retention of belongings,
all revolve around the authorization granted in paragraph 2(1), which provides
as follows: ‘An examining officer may question a person to whom this paragraph
applies for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling
within section 40(1)(b).’  And section 40(1)(b) deems as a ‘terrorist’ any person
who ‘is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of
acts of terrorism.’  So it was only lawful under Schedule 7 to question Miranda if it
was for the purpose of determining whether he was concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.
The common law of judicial review requires that a statutory power only be used
to further the purposes for which it was conferred, and not for any other purpose:
Padfield v Minister of Agriculture [1968] AC 997 (HL). This substantive law thus
forbids any use of the Terrorism Act 2000 to stop and detain Miranda for either the
purposes of harassment, or to harvest/destroy any leaked classified information he
had in his possession.
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The European Convention on Human Rights also protects his rights. The rights to
liberty (art.5), privacy (art.8), and freedom of conscience (art.10), had been interfered
with.  If it can be shown that the Terrorism Act was not appropriately used, all these
rights would also have been violated because in no case would the interference with
them have been ‘in accordance with law,’ the very lowest bar any argument must be
clear to justify an infringement of our rights.
So Miranda could obtain a declaration from the court that the conduct was not
authorized under the statute and thus illegal, as well as a violation of Convention
rights, either by way of an application for judicial review or, better still, as part of a
civil action for the tort of false imprisonment. So says the constitution in ideal times.
2.     But aren’t the powers in Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 extremely
broad, effectively preventing any real judicial control?
Yes and no. The powers are extremely broad.  As is widely reported in the press, the
exceptional aspect of the Schedule 7 powers is that officials do not need to have any
reasonable grounds for detention, searches, and retention of belongings (para.2(4)).
 But where the facts show that the power is being used to detain someone for a
reason other than determining whether they are or are aiding terrorists, the courts
have the power to step in. In the case of R (CC) v Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis [2011] EWHC 3316 (Admin), Justice Collins of the High Court did just
that.  The case involved someone who was detained, but under circumstances
where the security services and police had already come to the view that he was a
terrorist. The real reason they used the Schedule 7 powers or interrogation was not
to answer the question of whether he was a terrorist, but rather as a way of obtaining
additional information from him (namely, that which would be untainted by torture, as
previous information extracted by others in Somalia had been). The Court quashed
this misuse of the power.  Of course, Miranda would make for a considerably more
sympathetic claimant that CC did, and the case confirms that judicial review will lie
where the facts clearly show a misuse of power.
But what exactly were the stated reasons for Miranda’s detention?  I have seen
no official printed declaration, but Theresa May, the Home Secretary, said in an
interview with the BBC on the evening of Tuesday, 20 August 2013, that she thought
‘that if the police believe that somebody has in their possession, highly sensitive,
stolen information which could help terrorists, which could lead to a loss of lives,
then it is right that the police act, and that’s what the law enables them to do.’ 
  This statement gives crucial information relevant to the legality of the action.
Possessing stolen classified information certainly does not make one ‘concerned
with’ commissioning or aiding terrorism, or else some of history’s finest journalists
become terrorists.  And the fact that information ‘could help terrorists’ cannot on its
own be relevant, for plenty of information and even cherished laws and liberties meet
that standard.
It is crucial that the powers in Schedule 7, to be regarded by the courts as ‘lawful,’[1]
must be read in conjunction with the Code of Practice issued under paragraph 6(1)
of Schedule 14 of the Terrorism Act 2000.   That Code affirms repeatedly that the
powers must only be used for the purposes of determining whether someone is a
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terrorist or is helping one.  It also tells officers when and how to use Schedule 7
powers. It insists, on p.8, that any detentions and interrogation ‘should be based on
informed considerations such as’ the following:
• ‘Known and suspected sources of terrorism;
• Individuals or groups whose current or past involvement in acts or threats of
terrorism is known or suspected and supporters or sponsors of such activity who
are known or suspected;
• Any information on the origins and/or location of terrorist groups;
• Possible current, emerging and future terrorist activity;
• The means of travel (and documentation) that a group or individuals involved in
terrorist activity could use;
• Emerging local trends or patterns of travel through specific ports or in the wider
vicinity that may be linked to terrorist activity.’
It is hard to see how Miranda’s type of case would ring alarm bells under any of
these factors.   The real issue for the authorities, under our present assumptions,
is not so much his link to terrorism, but rather his unauthorized possession and
dissemination of classified and sensitive information. Even if that information poses
a strategic threat vis-à-vis foreign nations, it would not trigger the application of
Schedule 7.
3.     In any court hearing involving Miranda, could
the government use  ‘secret evidence’ against him,
preventing him from seeing and challenging such
evidence?
Yes, it could (though might not), provided it had some type of confidential evidence
supporting its decision.  If it did, the safety valves in the Justice and Security Act
2013 that aim to control abuse of this power would provide only weak protection.
However, if the pretext for Miranda’s detention is as we are assuming, his may be
the egregious case in which they work.
‘Secret evidence’ is evidence introduced in Closed Material Proceedings (CMP), in
which a party is excluded from proceedings while adverse evidence against him/her
is heard by the court.  In such cases, a special advocate (security cleared lawyer) is
appointed by the government to represent the excluded party, but even the special
advocates have protested that the procedure is ‘fundamentally unfair’ because they
cannot consult with the party after seeing the closed material.[2]
Section 6 of the Justice and Security Act 2013 now provides the power that could
be used in Miranda’s case. The Secretary of State (Theresa May) would apply
to the court for a declaration that CMP could be used. The court ‘may’ grant the
declaration if satisfied of two conditions: (a) that if the judge allowed a regular
civil trial or hearing, the secretary of state would be required to disclose ‘sensitive
material’ (i.e. material that ‘would be damaging to national security’ (s.6(11)); and
(b) it would be in the interests of ‘fair and effective administration of justice’ to allow
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closed proceedings.  The first of these conditions would likely be very easily met,
especially in a case like Miranda’s which revolves around national security.  The
second condition is one of the few potentially effective safety valves against the
exercise of the power.   If the judge concludes that it is not ‘fair and effective’ to
use the procedure, the secret evidence could not be used in proceedings against
Miranda, and in any litigated case there would be considerable argument on this
point.  Yet there would need to be convincing evidence already in the public domain
that the government is seeking to avoid stating its real reason for detention. And
the judge must be confident that there is not some other good reason for detention
contained in the closed evidence.
If the judge decided to allow the CMP to go ahead (i.e. the first safety valve did
not assist Miranda), then the second safety valve would come into play: a special
advocate would be appointed under s.9 of the Justice and Security Act 2013.  The
special advocate could see all the closed evidence and probe its veracity. If it is as
flimsy as it appears to be, it may be one of the few cases where the special advocate
could effectively fulfill its stated function.  Special advocates are, to be fair, typically
independent barristers of the very highest integrity and quality.  But the special
advocate would be unable to communicate with Miranda after seeing the closed
evidence.  So if the government presents a remotely coherent story about any whiff
of a link between Miranda and terrorist activities, there will be little even a brilliant
special advocate can do to rebut the claims.
4.     Apart from Miranda’s case, aren’t the powers
in Schedule 7 too broad to be compatible with our
right to privacy and liberty under the European
Convention on Human Rights?
Miranda has friends as well as enemies in high places.  But what about the average
Malik, detained and shaken down at Heathrow on his way home from the Hajj?
  Just that person has taken a case challenging the Convention-compatibility of
Schedule 7, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found the
claim admissible:  Malik v The United Kingdom (Application No. 32968/11) (28
May 2013).  Malik argued that the broad Schedule 7 powers violated his rights
to liberty under article 5(1) and to privacy under article 8(1) because Schedule 7
failed to require that the examining officer act on ‘reasonable suspicion’ that the
detained person was concerned in terrorism.[3]   The case has good potential for
success, because the earlier ECtHR case of Gillan & Quinton v UK (Application No.
4158/05) (28 June 2010) rejected a highly similar stop-and-search power contained
in what was originally section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000.[4]   The reasoning in
Gillan confirms that both the liberty and privacy interests are engaged in Malik and
Miranda’s situations.  The crucial finding in the Gillan case was that the stop and
search powers were not ‘in accordance with the law’ (as required under article
8(2)) because ‘in the absence of any obligation on the part of the officer to show
a reasonable suspicion, it is likely to be difficult if not impossible to prove that the
power was improperly exercised’ (para.86).
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The reasoning in Gillan applies quite plainly to the Schedule 7 powers as well, and
thus Malik and Miranda’s cases. However, there are two distinguishing factors about
Schedule 7 which complicate any straightforward application.  First, the Court in
Gillan was ‘struck’ by the fact that none of the thousands of stop-and-searches
under s.44 had led to a terrorism-related arrest.  The powers under Schedule 7
have, by contrast, led to 24 terrorism-related arrests.  Whether that tips the scales
of proportionality is another story.  There is no significant theoretical difference
between no arrests and extremely few arrests.  And we would also need to examine
other data such as charges laid and successful prosecutions before coming to
any conclusion on the matter. Second, however, the Government in Gillan argued
unsuccessfully that judicial review or an action for damages could have provided a
remedy for any abuse of power under s.44. The Court rejected the claim, finding it
highly unlikely that any such claim would succeed without any ‘reasonable suspicion’
qualification (para.84).  Yet in the case of Schedule 7, there in fact has been one
successful judicial review claim (again, whether that is enough is another story),
and a willingness to find damages under the common law for Miranda’s case might,
ironically, save this capacious power from Strasbourg’s gavel.
So the wise government lawyers, in other words, might strategically lose the battle
with Miranda under the common law in order to win the Schedule 7 war with Malik
under the Convention. Doing so would be politically tricky, however, because the
government has admitted that No10 Downing Street knew of the detention. A
flagrant and knowing misuse of executive power, which is what the court must find
under the common law, would politically look no finer than an adverse judgment
from a foreign court.  Indeed, adverse judgments from Strasbourg are helpful talking
points for Tory politicians speaking to the tabloid press.
5.     Isn’t this a veiled assault on freedom of the
press? Can the courts do anything about that?
The court could do something about this exercise of power in Miranda’s case in
particular.  There is no doubt that the detention and interference with Miranda’s
belongings interferes with his freedom of expression as understood by the ECtHR
(see e.g. Foka v Turkey (Application No. 28940/95) (24 June 2008).  The fact that
he was acting on behalf of a journalist, if not working directly for the newspaper,
suggests that an interference with his rights in this respect is also an interference
with media freedom. It is likely the court would or at least could so find.
But can the government interfere with press freedom in that way?  We should get
one thing straight right away – the Strasbourg court has in a range of cases found
that even the restraint of publication on grounds of national security is permissible
and legitimate, and the House of Lords, for its part, found that article 10 gives
no ‘public interest’ defence to whistleblowers who violate the Official Secrets Act
1989.[5]  But even so, any such interference with expression must be justified
under article 10(2) as ‘in accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic
society.’ As we saw above, the state’s case apparently falls at that hurdle. And this
is very relevant to the press freedom issue. Any exercise of the powers to restrain
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publication or to press charges would be carried out under the Official Secrets
Act 1989 and the common law of confidence.  Those proceedings would carry the
ordinary, and thus more robust, set of procedural and substantive protections for
persons or media being investigated, tried or sued.   No secret evidence would be
admissible in any criminal prosecution either, a fact the government would have to
reckon with before pressing its claim aggressively.
When government officials met with the Guardian editor and more or less (ordered)
him to destroy the GCHQ files or face prosecution, the action was bold and troubling
(but also complicated given allegations that foreign governments might obtain
the data).  Their legal rights to do so, however, are clear. Section 5 of the Official
Secrets Act 1989 makes it a criminal offence for one to further disclose information
that one knows was unlawfully disclosed by another under other (applicable)
provisions of the Official Secrets Act.
Even so, the security forces went further than ‘cordial’ threats when they detained
and searched Miranda. That would be, data-wise, and assuming it was unlawful, the
equivalent of entering and searching the Guardian’s premises for information without
lawful warrant and taking away what they found for 7 days.  Indeed, the actions
taken at the Guardian were gentlemanly by comparison.
6.     What remedies could the court give?
Assuming Miranda could clear these hurdles and show in court that the Terrorism
Act 2000 was misused, he would be entitled to a range of remedies.  He could obtain
a declaration from the court that the authorities acted unlawfully, both under the
common law and, under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in connection with
the violations of the European Convention rights.  He could sue for damages, under
the common law (a tort action for false imprisonment) and seek damages under
section 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (though the former leads to higher damages
awards).   No doubt the Guardian has sufficient interest to intervene in the case, and
could perhaps even be joined as an interested party. It could argue that the issue
of press freedom be put front and centre in the court’s judgment as well, and could
conceivably obtain nominal damages if the invasion of liberty were regarded as an
indirect assault on its own interests.
As this post goes to press, it has come to light that Miranda’s lawyers are also
seeking an interlocutory injunction to restrain the government from harvesting or
retaining any information from Miranda’s possessions.  The court must here be
persuaded that there is a serious question to be tried; that there will be irreparable
injury to a party if the injunction is not given; and that the balance of inconvenience
between the parties favours granting the temporary injunction pending the full
resolution of the matter in subsequent proceedings: American Cyanamid Co. v
Ethicon Ltd. [1975] AC 396 (HL).  The law, here too, appears from a distance to be
on Miranda’s side, though it is unclear whether any success in that application can
unlearn what has already been learned by the security services so far.[6]
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Conclusion
This discussion has sought to answer not the real question of whether Miranda will
succeed in court, but the more abstract question about how a person in his situation
would fair, assuming the worst, under the British legal system and constitution (which
incorporates much of the European Convention on Human Rights).  Real cases are
messier. Litigation risks, costs, and settlement offers bound up by confidentiality
agreements always pervade the parties’ decisions (over and above the stress of it
all).  The best the public can hope for is that the devil’s case scenario discussed here
is not as accurate as it first appears to be.
The author thanks Tom Hickman, Gavin Phillipson, and Catherine Gilfedder for
helpful feedback, and Alma Mozetic for excellent editorial assistance.
This post has appeared previously on the UK Constitutional Law Group Blog and is
reposted here with kind permission by the author.
[1] An implication of Gillan v Commissioner of Police [2006] 2 AC 307, p.345ff (Lord
Bingham).
[2] Miranda’s case is an interesting test case for the use of the CMP procedure
before and after the introduction of the Justice and Security Act 2013.   In the Al
Rawi and others v The Security Services [2011] UKSC 34 case, the Supreme Court
held that where the CMP procedure was not provided for by statute (which is also
Miranda’s case), then the courts had no power to improvise one as part of the
ordinary judicial process.  Any such incursion, they held, interferes so strongly with
our basic rights that only an Act of Parliament could authorize it.   So the Coalition
Government authorized just that with the Justice and Security Act 2013, after a
short consultation period that was subject to one of the more vigorous and lop-
sided choruses of disapproval in recent memory.  See the consultation responses,
and see in particular the response from the Bingham Centre on the Rule of Law
and that of the Special Advocates, as well as Liberty and Reprieve).  See also
the responses of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and House of Lords’
Constitution Committee, which are also quite notable for their criticism. Much of the
criticism in these responses and reports was of a proposal to make CMP much more
widely available than what was adopted in the bill.  However, the criticism in the
JCHR report linked above takes account of the bill in its near final form.
[3] Malik did not take proceedings in the UK because damages were unavailable
to him under the Human Rights Act 1998 when he challenged the convention-
compatibility of Schedule 7. This was accepted by the Court as meeting the
obligation to exhaust domestic remedies.
[4] This was subsequently replaced by the government with high-handed rhetoric in
Part IV of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
[5] Observer v UK (1992) 14 EHRR 153 (ECtHR); Sunday Times v UK (No.2) (1992)
14 EHRR 229; Brind v UK (1994) 18 EHRR CD76 ; R v Shayler [2002] UKHL 11.
- 7 -
[6] The Guardian reports that Miranda won his case, but the terms of the judgment
(as yet unpublished) do appear to permit the continued use of the material by the
authorities for reasons of national security. It is thus doubtful whether the ruling does
much to tie their hands.
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